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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the case of Eduin Rordriguez.  Eduin was abandoned by 
both parents at a young age in Honduras.1  He embarked on a dangerous 
journey, moving from the tops of freight trains through Mexico, and 
swimming through the Rio Grande to enter the United States at Hidalgo, 
Texas.2  Under the language of § 1324(a)(2), the people who helped 
Eduin cross the border into Texas knew that he did not have prior official 
authorization to do so, and would be prosecuted under § 1324(a)(2) in 
the Eleventh Circuit.  If Eduin presented them with a fake visa, it is 
unclear whether this would this exculpate them.  The language of 
§ 1324(a)(2) in its current state does not provide a predictable answer, 
and depending on the jurisdiction in which this offense took place, the 
answer may vary greatly. 
Now consider the case of Miguel Perez and Juan Carlos Valdez—
two people who saw some people stranded in the water, and thought that 
they were doing a good thing, they were just helping them out.3  The two 
were in their boat, off the coast of Florida, when they spotted another 
boat in the distance.4  The passengers in the other vessel seemed to be 
having engine problems, and were signaling for help when they caught 
Perez’s eye.5  When Perez and Valdez stopped, the passengers told them 
that they were from Miami, had been fishing, and were having trouble 
with their boat.6  When they agreed to bring the passengers to land, Perez 
and Valdez asked all of them to see identification, except for one who 
                                                                                                                                     
 1 Julia Preston, Young and Alone, Facing Court and Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, 
August 25, 2012, available at www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/us/more-young-illegal-
immigrants-face-deportation.hmtl?pagewanted. 
 2 Id. 
 3 United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 776 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
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began to cry when they spoke with her.7  As Perez and Valdez docked 
their boat in Miami-Dade County later that night, local police discovered 
that the passengers were actually Cuban nationals illegally entering the 
United States through Perez’ boat—unbeknownst to Perez.8  Both Perez 
and Valdez were charged with, among other things, violations of 8 
U.S.C. §1324 (a)(2)(B)(iii), the Immigration and Naturalization statute 
that criminalizes bringing aliens into the United States illegally.9 
While Perez and Valdez did bring undocumented aliens10 into the 
United States, they asked all but one of the passengers to see their 
identification and there was no reason for them to know that any of these 
people did not actually have authorization to be in the United States.11  
Yet, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
found Perez and Valdez guilty of violating § 1324(a)(2), and the 
Eleventh Circuit later affirmed.12  As a result of the Eleventh Circuit’s 
interpretation of the statute, Perez’s helpful actions cost him his 
reputation and placed him on trial for a crime that he may have 
unknowingly committed.13  The Eleventh Circuit’s reading of 
§ 1324(a)(2) does not require knowledge of an alien’s lack of 
authorization to enter the United States, but rather calls for knowledge or 
a mere reckless disregard of the fact.14 
Yet, not all jurisdictions agree with this determination.15  In other 
federal circuits, such as the Ninth Circuit, to be found culpable under 
§ 1324(a)(2), there must be more than simply the acts that constitute the 
offense.16  In order to be culpable, one must possess a specific intent to 
violate the statute.17  The inconsistent application of the mens rea 
requirement is problematic, and requires courts to constantly apply their 
own interpretation of what they think the mens rea requirement means or 
                                                                                                                                     
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 775. 
 9 Perez, 443 F.3d at 774. 
 10 For a discussion regarding the use of the terminology “undocumented aliens” as 
opposed to “illegal aliens” or “illegal immigrants,” and the connotations and sentiments 
that accompany each term see generally Roque Planas, Jose Antonio Vargas Restarts 
‘Illegal’ v. ‘Undocumented” Debates, Highlighting Role of Latino Media, HUFFINGTON 
POST  (Sept.  27, 2012)  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/27/jose-antonio-vargas-
illegal-undocumented_n_1918631.html; See also Ilona Bray, NOLO BLOG, ( Sept. 27, 
2012) http://blog.nolo.com/immigration/2012/09/25/should-the-media-use-the-term-illeg
al-alien/. 
 11 Perez, 443 F.3d at 774. 
 12 Id. at 782. 
 13 Id. at 779. 
 14 See United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051, 1070 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 15 Id. 
 16 United States v. Barajas-Montiel, 185 F.3d 947, 953 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 17 Id. 
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should mean.18  Resolving the conflicting applications of the mens rea 
standard is necessary to appropriately punish the types of behavior that 
Congress intended, without harshly punishing innocent actors.19  The 
Supreme Court should address this issue and clarify what the applicable 
mens rea standard is.  On its face, the statute does not require a specific 
mental intent or willful violation.20  Another way to clarify the current 
confusion is to revise the statute, and use different language to make it 
clear to reviewing courts that a person’s actions must rise, at minimum, 
to reckless disregard in order for them to be appropriately punished 
under the statute.  Possible revisions to the statute may include looking at 
a different standard to determine culpability, or adopting a points system 
that mimics the aggravating and mitigating factors of the Model Penal 
Code. 
This comment examines the language of 8 U.S.C § 1324(a)(2), 
address the current disagreement regarding the applicable mens rea 
standard among the circuits that have addressed this issue, and propose 
possible revisions to the statute that can help to resolve the issue.  Part II 
looks to the language and history of the statute as well as the current split 
among the different federal circuits.  Part III analyzes public policy 
concerns involved in the consideration of § 1324(a)(2) and immigration 
policy on a whole.  Finally, Part IV contains proposed solutions to the 
statutory issue. 
II. THE CURRENT LANGUAGE AND APPLICATION OF § 1324(A)(2) 
a. The Impact of the “Mariel Boatlift” and the Transition Toward the 
Current Statute 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) was created in 
1952.21  Prior to 1952, immigration law had never been collected and 
codified into a single body of law.22  The INA is included in the United 
States Code and has undergone many revisions since.23  One significant 
revision of the INA took place in 1986, when Congress substantially 
rewrote § 1324 to expand the scope of activities punishable under the 
                                                                                                                                     
 18 Brett Sabbag, Case Comment, Transnational Criminal Law—Eleventh Circuit 
Does Not Require Proof of Criminal Intent for Alien Smuggling Offenses—United States 
v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051 (11th Cir. 2011), 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 493, 
502 (2012). 
 19 See id. at 498. 
 20 Id. 
 21 U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/laws/immigra
tion-and-nationality-act (last visited March 5, 2014). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
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statute.24  The revisions were a part of the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), which was one piece of a significant 
reform of immigration law and policy.25 
IRCA was enacted partially in response to what is historically 
known as the “Mariel Boatlift,” and was an attempt to exercise control 
over persistent unauthorized entry by foreign aliens and “close the back 
door on illegal immigration so that the front door on legal immigration 
remains open.” 26  Toward the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, the 
United States embraced an “open arms” policy towards Cuban refugees 
who had been experiencing economic hardships and political turmoil in 
Cuba.27 As a result of this open policy, approximately 125,000 Cuban 
aliens fled to the United States over the course of roughly six months 
during 1980.28  The Immigration and Naturalization Service was not 
prepared to handle such a large number of arriving aliens.29  Processing, 
overseeing, and managing an excessively large number of Cuban aliens, 
as well as all of the other applicants seeking entry and status, proved to 
be a very significant burden and caused the Service to suffer because of 
it.30  Congress then enacted § 1324(a)(2) to further criminalize bringing 
undocumented persons into the United States.31 
b. The Previous Version of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) Created a Gap in 
Immigration Law 
With the addition to § 1324(a), Congress intended to expand the 
scope of the activities that are punishable.32  At that time, many members 
of Congress found judicial opinions concerning the prosecution of 
persons assisting the unlawful entry of Cuban aliens during the Mariel 
Boatlift to be troubling.33  Generally, these opinions found that the 
immigration statutes as they existed did not penalize those actions that 
are “clearly prejudicial to the interests of the United States.” 34  The case 
                                                                                                                                     
 24 H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 65 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5669. 
 25 H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 45, supra note 22, at 5649. 
 26 Id. 
 27 United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d at 1079 (quoting Nation: Open Heart, Open 
Arms, TIME, May 19, 1980 at 14). 
 28 UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, Alien Migrant Interdiction, http://www.uscg.mil/hq
/cg5/cg531/AMIO/mariel.asp (last visited 05/17/14). 
 29 H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 65, supra note 22, at 5669. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 5670. 
 32 Id. at 5669. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
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of United States v. Zayas-Morales35 is one example that Congress cited 
that highlights the troubling outcomes that the statute produced.36 
In Zayas-Morales, the Eleventh Circuit considered the culpability 
of captains and owners of the vessels used to transport Cuban nationals 
to the United States during the Mariel Boatlift, also historically known as 
the “Freedom Flotilla.”37  The pertinent immigration statute as it existed 
at the time was 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(1).38  In analyzing whether the 
defendants possessed the requisite criminal intent to violate the statute, 
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that even though subsection (a)(1) did not 
include a specific criminal intent, subsections (2), (3), and (4) did in fact 
include knowledge requirements that should be imputed to subsection 
(1).  Further, relevant case law has held that state of mind is an essential 
element of proving the statute.39  Ultimately, the circuit court found that 
the actions of the defendants were not punishable under § 1324(a) 
because, while the defendants did bring undocumented aliens into the 
United States, they did so based upon the aliens’ representation that they 
                                                                                                                                     
 35 United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 36 H.R. REP. No. 99-682, 66, supra note 22, at 5670. 
 37 Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d at 1273–74. 
 38 The previous version of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a) provided: 
Any person who, including the owner, operator, pilot, master, commanding 
officer, agent or Consignee of any means of transportation who – 
(1) Brings into or lands in the United States, by any means 
of transportation or otherwise, or attempts, by himself or 
through another, to bring into or land in the United States, by 
any means of transportation or otherwise; 
(2) Knowing that he is in the United States in violation of 
law, and knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that 
his entry into the United States occurred less than three years 
prior thereto, transports, or moves or attempts to transport or 
move, within the United States by means of transportation or 
otherwise, in furtherance of such violation of law; 
(3) Willfully or knowingly conceals, harbors, or shields 
from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from 
detection, in any place, including any building or any means of 
transportation or; 
(4) Willfully or knowingly encourages or induces, or 
attempts to encourage or induce, either directly or indirectly, 
the entry into the United States of – 
Any alien, including an alien crewman, not duly admitted by an immigration 
officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United States 
under the terms of this chapter or any other law relating to the immigration 
or expulsion of aliens, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction 
thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2000 or by imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding five years, or both, for each alien in respect to 
whom any violation of this subsection occurs . . . . 
Id. at 1274 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a) (1976)). 
 39 Id. at 1277. 
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would seek legal status in the country; in fact, each Cuban alien was 
brought directly to immigration officials upon entry.40  The Eleventh 
Circuit found that a criminal mind was such an essential element to a 
violation of § 1324(a), that without the intent to violate the statute, it was 
impossible to do so.41 
A majority in Congress found the results of Zayas-Morales 
troubling because it presented a gap in immigration law, where 
committing an illegal act that impacted the interests of the United States 
went unpunished and left open the possibility that undocumented 
immigrants could flood the country via its ports of entry with minimal 
consequences to those who assisted them.42  Thus, Congress amended 8 
U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(2), which in its current form provides: 
Any person who, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that 
an alien has not received prior official authorization to come to, 
enter, or reside in the United States, brings to or attempts to bring 
to the United States in any manner whatsoever, such alien, 
regardless of any official action which may later be taken with 
respect to such alien, for each alien in respect to whom a 
violation of this paragraph occurs— 
(A) be fined in accordance with Title 18 or imprisoned 
not more than one year,or both; or 
B) in the case of— 
(i) an offense committed with the intent or with 
reason to believe that the alien unlawfully brought 
into the United States will commit an offense 
against the United States or any State punishable by 
imprisonment for more than 1 year, 
(ii) an offense done for the purpose of commercial 
advantage or private financial gain, or 
(iii) an offense in which the alien is not upon arrival 
immediately brought and presented to an appropriate 
immigration officer at a designated port of entry,  
be fined under Title 18 and shall be imprisoned, in the case of a 
first or second violation of subparagraph (B)(iii), not more than 
                                                                                                                                     
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 H.R. REP. 99-682, supra note 22, at 5670. 
416 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 10:409 
10 years, in the case of a first or second violation of 
subparagraph (B)(i) or (B)(ii), not less than 3 nor more than 10 
years, and for any other violation, not less than 5 nor more than 
15 years.43 
By substantially rewriting the existing statute and adding subsection 
(a)(2), Congress tried to deter the transportation of undocumented aliens 
into the United States and significantly reduce the amount of smuggling 
offenses committed each year.44  Notably, subsection (a)(2) applies to 
those who act in “knowing or reckless disregard” of an alien’s prior 
authorization. 
The Supreme Court has defined “knowingly” as meaning that the 
offender knew the facts constituting their offense, although the court 
does not always require that the offender know that the act itself is 
illegal.45  Unless the language of a statute indicates otherwise, the term 
“knowingly” simply requires proof that the defendant knew of the facts 
that constitute the offense.46  “Reckless disregard,” the new language of 
§ 1324(a), has been defined as a conscious awareness but deliberate 
indifference to facts and circumstances that, if properly considered, 
indicate a probability that the alien did not have authorization to enter the 
United States.47  If Congress intended to dispense with a mens rea 
element of the statute, and simply make § 1324(a)(2) a strict liability 
offense, then there would necessarily have to be an indication of such an 
intent.48  The language of the statute indicates that culpable actions can 
be done “knowingly” or in “reckless disregard,”49 meaning actions done 
without a specific, criminal intent to violate the statute may still violate it 
nonetheless. 
c. Conflicting Interpretations of the New § 1324(a)(2) 
Most of the current case law concerning the mental intent necessary 
to violate subsection (a)(2) comes from the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits.  
                                                                                                                                     
 43 8 U.S.C. § 2314(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 44 H.R. REP. 99-682, supra note 22, at 5670. 
 45 Humpty Dumpty on Mens Rea Standards: A Proposed Methodology For 
Interpretation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 521, 523–24 (1999) (“[A]lthough the Court has 
consistently defined ‘knowingly’ to require that the defendant actually knew he 
committed the acts that made his conduct criminal . . . when the Court hears a case 
involving a statute that criminalizes morally suspect behavior, it defines ‘knowingly’ to 
require only that the defendant knew he acted, regardless of whether the defendant knew 
those actions were illegal.”; see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 623 (1994) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 46 Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998). 
 47 United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 781 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 48 Staples, 511 U.S. at 605. 
 49 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(2) (2012). 
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Their decisions have created a circuit split concerning the applicable 
mens rea that the statute requires.  On its face, the plain language of the 
statute does not require a willful violation of the law to establish a 
punishable offense; rather, it simply calls for a violation done 
“knowingly” or with “reckless disregard.” 50  However, the application of 
the statute has been inconsistent at best arbitrary at worst. 
d. The Ninth Circuit’s Approach 
In 1999, the Ninth Circuit was faced with the question of whether 
or not § 1324 (a)(2) required willful conduct, an issue that had not 
previously been addressed by the courts.51  In United States v. Barajas-
Montiel, the Ninth Circuit considered the mental intent required to 
convict the defendant of bringing undocumented aliens into the United 
States for financial gain in violation of the felony provision of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324 (a)(2)(B).52  The defendant had been involved in an operation in 
which she helped facilitate the unauthorized entry of over twenty aliens, 
and had received several thousands of dollars in payment for her 
services.53  She was convicted of, among other charges, six counts of 
violation of § 1324 (a)(2)(B)(ii).54 
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that no circuit court had 
previously addressed the issue of the mens rea required under § 1324 
(a)(2).55  Because the mens rea requirement for the particular subsection 
that the defendant was convicted under had not previously been 
considered by a court, the defendant argued that the court should apply 
the same mens rea standard that the Ninth Circuit applied in United 
                                                                                                                                     
 50 See Sabbag, supra note 16, at 498. 
 51 United States v. Barajas-Montiel, 185 F.3d 947, 951 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 52 Id. 
 53 See Id. at 949–51. On multiple occasions, police surveillance observed Barajas-
Montiel with her brother Everardo Barajas (“Everardo”), driving two separate vehicles in 
tandem.  Id. at 949.  On each occasion, Barajas-Montiel followed her brother’s vehicle, 
while driving a car with its rear suspension lifted, to a remote location.  Id.  When Baraja-
Montiel’s vehicle reappeared, each time the rear suspension no longer appeared to be 
lifted.  Id.  On the first occasion, police surveillance discovered Barajas-Montiel and 
Everardo arrive at Barajas-Montiel’s residence and exit their vehicles.  Id.  
Approximately eight to ten Hispanic men also exited the vehicles, none of whom had 
been visible prior to that moment.  Id.  On another occasion, Barajas-Montiel, her 
boyfriend Raul Esquival-Castillo (“Raul”), and Everardo were spotted by police driving 
three separate vehicles along the same route that Barajas-Montiel and Everardo had taken 
on the first occasion.  Id.  This time, police followed the three vehicles, and arrived at a 
residence where they apprehended twenty undocumented aliens.  Id. at 950.  A search of 
Barajas-Montiel’s residence revealed over $8000 and numerous records bearing Barajas-
Montiel’s name.  Id. 
 54 Id. at 950. 
 55 Id. at 951. 
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States v Nguyen,56 in which the subsection in question was section 
1324(a)(1)(A).57  In Nguyen, the court considered whether the defendant 
violated § 1324 (a)(1)(A) by bringing aliens into the United States at a 
location other than a designated port of entry.58  Nguyen was a mechanic 
on a vessel that was used to bring more than one hundred unauthorized 
aliens into the United States. While the defendant had been suspicious of 
the legal status of some of the people onboard, he did not interfere with 
the actions of those who were in charge of the smuggling scheme.59  In 
that case, the Ninth Circuit determined that,  even though Congress 
substantially rewrote § 1324 in 1986 to expand the scope of proscribed 
activity under the statute, based on widely accepted common law notions 
of statutory interpretation it was highly unlikely that Congress intended 
IRCA to dispense with a mens rea requirement.60  As such, the court held 
that for a conviction under subsection (a)(1), there must be proof of 
criminal intent.61 
In Barajas-Montiel, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the reasoning that 
Congress was unlikely to have intended to dispense with a mental intent 
element in the revised language of subsection (a)(2).  It determined that 
looking to the prior treatment of another subsection of the same 
immigration statue was the best way to infer the appropriate mens rea 
standard.62  In particular, the court noted that the statute bears significant 
overlap between crimes punished under (a)(1) and (a)(2) as well as 
significant punishments under both.63  The court refused to dispense with 
mental intent as a critical element of the felony provision of (a)(2) 
because of the potential for lengthy and serious penalties for potentially 
innocent persons who technically violate the statute.64  Accordingly, the 
Ninth Circuit held that a specific intent to violate United States 
immigration laws is required with respect to § 1324 (a)(2)(B).65 
Since coming to this determination, the Ninth Circuit has 
consistently held that a conviction under § 1324(a)(2) requires a showing 
of specific intent, even though this determination seems to clearly fly in 
the face of the specifically enumerated mens rea requirement in the 
language of the statute.  For example, in the case of United States v. 
                                                                                                                                     
 56 United States v. Nguyen, 73 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 57 Barajas-Montiel, 185 F.3d at 951. 
 58 Nguyen, 73 F.3d at 889. 
 59 Id. at 899–90. 
 60 Id. at 893. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Barajas-Montiel, 185 F.3d at 951–52. 
 63 Id. at 953. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
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Dixon,66 Terrill Dixon was convicted for bringing an undocumented alien 
into the United States67 under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii)68 and (iii).69  
Dixon contested the jury instructions used in his case, claiming that they 
were not sufficient to convey to the jury that his guilt under subsection 
(a)(2)(B)(ii) must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.70  On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit determined that the jury instructions used in Dixon’s case 
were in fact sufficient because they clearly specified that “a defendant 
must be shown to have acted with criminal intent to be guilty” of the 
charge,71 thereby emphasizing the essential nature of the mens rea 
element for a conviction under the statute. 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit looks for clear evidence that is 
demonstrative of a specific intent to violate the statute.  In the case of 
United States v. Singh,72 Singh was convicted of several crimes 
connected to smuggling violations including an offense under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii).73  Kavel Multani arranged the smuggling scheme, 
and the first step was for Apla Patel and another one of the aliens 
involved in the scheme to walk across the U.S./Canadian border from 
British Columbia to Seattle.74  Singh then met Patel at the Sea-Tac Inn 
near the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport.75  Singh used his taxi to 
pick her up, and the following day Singh used a credit card to purchase 
two tickets for Patel and himself to travel to New York.76  Upon arrival 
in New York, they met Patel’s husband and Singh received his 
payment.77  In considering whether Singh possessed the requisite specific 
intent necessary to establish a violation of § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii), the court 
                                                                                                                                     
 66 201 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 67 Id.  Dixon was stopped by Customs Inspector Sherman Lee for inspection upon 
entry into the United States from Mexico. When Inspector Lee requested that Dixon 
provide him with the keys so that he could further inspect the vehicle, Dixon did not 
comply and drove off. Officers later found Dixon’s car apparently unoccupied; however, 
upon inspection, the officers discovered two Mexican aliens in the car’s hatchback.  Id. 
 68 Section 1324 (a)(2)(B)(ii) provides criminal penalties for a person who brings an 
alien who has not received prior official authorization into the United States “for the 
purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) 
(2012). 
 69 Section 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) provides criminal penalties for a person who brings an 
alien who has not received prior official authorization into the United States and “the 
alien is not upon arrival immediately brought and presented to an appropriate 
immigration officer at a designated port of entry.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2012). 
 70 Id. at 1231–32. 
 71 Id. at 1231 (emphasis added). 
 72 United States v. Singh, 532 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 73 Id. at 1056. 
 74 Id. at 1055. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 1055–56. 
 77 Id. 1056. 
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noted that merely showing that a defendant “was associated with 
someone who was involved with a smuggling operation in some 
unknown way or that [they] were associated with the transportation of 
the aliens within the United States after the fact of smuggling was 
insufficient to show that she had the specific intent” to commit the 
offense.78  The court placed emphasis on the fact that though Singh’s “act 
of transporting an alien commenced only after the ‘brings to’ offense was 
completed,” Singh had agreed ahead of time to assist in transporting an 
alien in the United States thereby indicating that the offense was 
something “he wished to bring about.”79  On this basis, the court found 
that Singh did possess the specific intent under the facts shown, and was 
as punishable as the principal in the smuggling scheme.80 
In United States v. Yoshida,81 the Ninth Circuit considered what 
level of involvement might serve as sufficient evidence of a mental intent 
to violate the statute.82  Yuami Yoshida was convicted under 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1324 (a)(1)(A)(iv) and (a)(2)(B)(ii) for assisting three Chinese 
citizens’ entry into the United States.83  The aliens were on a three-part 
journey to the United States, with their flight leaving from Narita Airport 
in Japan.84  In Narita Airport, an escort that met the aliens pointed to 
Yoshida and told them that Yoshida would be their escort for the next leg 
of the journey.85  The aliens followed Yoshida towards their flight, and 
they were the last people to board.86  Upon arrival, authorities found 
Yoshida’s journey and frequent traveling as indicated by her passport to 
be suspicious.87  Yoshida never spoke with the aliens in question88; 
however, she was believed to have brought them into the United States 
for financial gain in violation of § 1324 (a)(2)(B)(ii).89  In her defense, 
Yoshida argued that airline employees allowed the aliens to board a 
plane and travel to the United States, that she did not have knowledge 
that the aliens lacked authorization to enter the country and therefore, she 
conversely presumed that they did.90  However, the court concluded that 
“Delta Airlines employees do not have the authority to admit aliens into 
                                                                                                                                     
 78 Singh, 532 F.3d at 1058. 
 79 Id. at 1058–59. 
 80 Id. at 1057–58. 
 81 United States v. Yoshida, 303 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 82 Id. at 1152. 
 83 Id. at 1147. 
 84 Id. at 1148. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Yoshida, 303 F.3d at 1149. 
 88 Id. at 1151. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id.  at 1152. 
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the United States, and the fact that Delta allowed the aliens onto the 
flight does not negate the evidence that Yoshida knew or recklessly 
disregarded the fact that the aliens did not have authorization to enter the 
United States.” 91  The mere fact that the aliens were able to board the 
plane was not sufficient to give Yoshida reasonable cause to believe that 
they were authorized to enter the United States, and a jury could 
reasonably infer criminal intent from Yoshida’s actions.92 
e. The Eleventh Circuit’s Different Approach to the Mens Rea 
Requirement, Creating a Circuit Split 
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit also considered the question of the 
mental intent necessary to violate 8 U.S.C. 1324 § (a)(2), and in making 
its determination, created a circuit split.93  In the case of United States v. 
Dominguez, Gustavo Dominguez was convicted under the felony 
provision of U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(2).94  In November of 2003, Dominguez, 
a sports agent working for Total Sports International (“TSI”), made an 
agreement with Ysbel Medina-Santos (“Medina”) to smuggle two Cuban 
nationals into the United States in exchange for 5% of any Major League 
Baseball contract that the players would potentially sign.95  The attempt 
to smuggle the players was successful, as was the Major League 
recruiting.96  Then, in July of 2004 Dominguez contacted Medina and 
asked him to smuggle five Cuban baseball players into the United 
States.97  After two smuggle attempts, the players were successfully 
brought into the country through Miami, and traveled to Los Angeles 
where they were to meet with Dominguez.98  Dominguez then had the 
players meet with an experienced immigration attorney who had been 
conducting work for TSI for a number of years, and began to process the 
players through immigration.99  During this time, TSI placed the players 
in an apartment complex, arranged for the players to attend try-outs with 
Major League Baseball scouts, and even participated in the filming of a 
documentary about Cuban baseball players in the United States.100 
Dominguez was convicted of—among other offenses—conspiring 
to, aiding and abetting the attempt to, and aiding and abetting the 
                                                                                                                                     
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 1153. 
 93 United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051, 1076 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 94 Id. at 1056. 
 95 Id. at 1056–57. 
 96 Id. at 1057. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 1057–58. 
 99 Dominguez, 661 F.3d at 1058. 
 100 Id. at 1058–59. 
422 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 10:409 
successful bringing of aliens to the United States for the purpose of 
commercial advantage and private financial gain in violation of 
§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii).101  Interestingly, Dominguez argued that he believed 
that the Cuban Adjustment Act102 and the Wet-Foot/ Dry-Foot policy was 
a basis for the players to have legal authorization to enter the United 
States.103  Because of his belief that Cuban nationals were granted special 
treatment pursuant to these immigration laws and policies, Dominguez 
felt that he lacked the requisite mental intent necessary for a conviction 
under § 1324 (a)(2).104 
However, the court rejected Dominguez’ argument,105 and 
determined that Dominguez’s knowledge of the Cuban Adjustment Act’s 
policies and the beliefs that came from them were not enough to 
exculpate him from liability under § 1324(a)(2).106  First, the Eleventh 
Circuit sought to determine the applicable mens rea standard for a 
conviction.  Though the court previously determined that mental intent 
was required for offenses under section 1324(a) in Zayas-Morales,107 the 
statute was substantially rewritten in 1986 and therefore, the court felt 
compelled to revisit the same question under the new language of the 
statute.108  The court considered the prior determination in Zayas-
Morales, the new language of the statute, and the determination made by 
the Ninth Circuit, the only other circuit to address this question.109  
Specifically, although the court considered the Ninth Circuit’s 
conclusion in Barajas-Montiel—which held that specific criminal intent 
                                                                                                                                     
 101 Id. at 1059. 
 102 Id. at 1059–60.  See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (1966)for the adjustment of a 
Cuban native’s status from alien to permanent resident if they have resided in the United 
States for two or more years). 
 103 Dominguez, 661 F.3d  at 1067 (“United States immigration law and policy afford 
special treatment to Cuban nationals who come to the United States. Under the Cuban 
Adjustment Act, a native or citizen of Cuba, who has been inspected and admitted or 
paroled into the United States and has been physically present in the United States for at 
least two years, can apply for permanent residency in the United States. By taking 
advantage of the CAA, Cuban nationals, who have no documents authorizing their 
presence in the United States, can remain in the United States without demonstrating that 
they suffered persecution or proving refugee status. The benefits of the CAA, however, 
can only apply to those Cubans who reach United States soil (those with ‘dry feet’) while 
Cubans who are interdicted at sea (those with ‘wet feet’) are repatriated to Cuba. This 
rule is commonly referred to as the ‘Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot’ Policy.”). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 1070. 
 107 Id. at 1069. 
 108 Id. at 1070. 
 109 Dominguez, 661 F.3d at 1070. 
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is a necessary element—it found the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning 
unconvincing.110 
The Eleventh Circuit looked to Congress’s intent to expand the 
scope of the activities considered criminal under the statute, as well as 
the fact that the language of the statute itself indicates that conduct done 
“knowingly” or in “reckless disregard” would satisfy the mens rea 
requirement.111  This led the court to believe that Congress never meant 
to impose a specific intent requirement.112  Even before Dominguez, the 
Eleventh Circuit had supported the notion that each word in a statute 
contributes to its meaning as a whole113 and thus it is consistent with the 
Eleventh Circuit’s notions of statutory interpretation to draw upon the 
plain meaning of each word in the statute.  Further, the court noted that 
the Cuban Adjustment Act and Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot policies114 did not 
officially authorize all Cuban nationals to enter the United States at their 
will; but rather they provided a means to take official action prior to 
entry, which § 1324(a)(2) makes clear is not an excuse for violation of 
the statute.115  For these reasons, Dominguez’s argument failed and the 
mens rea element, knowing or in reckless disregard, was satisfied for his 
offense.116  The Eleventh Circuit’s position in Dominguez, disagreeing 
with the Ninth Circuit’s position, resulted in a circuit split. 
Like the Ninth Circuit in Yoshida, the Eleventh Circuit has 
similarly determined that evidence of mens rea is determined on the basis 
of what a jury reasonably believes the defendant knew and intended.117  
In United States v. Kendrick, the Eleventh Circuit considered the district 
court’s dismissal of Kendrick’s motion for a judgment of acquittal of the 
charges brought against him under § 1324 (a)(2)(B)(ii).118  Kendrick was 
charged with, among other things, bringing an alien who did not have 
prior official authorization to enter into the United States for personal 
financial gain in conjunction with marijuana trafficking.119  When the 
other charges against him were dropped, Kendrick moved for a judgment 
of acquittal for the remaining charge under § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii).120  The 
court denied Kendrick’s motion and the jury ultimately found him guilty 
                                                                                                                                     
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 United States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238, 1258 (2009) (Bartlett, J., dissenting) 
(quoting United States v. Canals-Jiminez, 943 F.2d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1991)). 
 114 See Dominguez, 661 F.3d at 1067. 
 115 Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1258. (Bartlett, J., dissenting). 
 116 Dominguez, 661 F.3d at 1070. 
 117 United States v. Kendrick, 682 F.3d 974, 985 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 118 Id. at 978. 
 119 Id. at 978–79. 
 120 Id. 
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of the smuggling charge.121  On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit considered 
whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Kendrick 
possessed the requisite mental intent to actually violate the statute.122  
Importantly, the court held that the standard was met if there was 
sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably conclude that Kendrick knew 
or was in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien he was transporting 
did not have authorization.123 The court found that, based upon the 
record, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to draw such an 
inference.124 
f. The Fifth and Second Circuits Examine Whether “Knowing” Means 
Knowing That the Alien Had Valid Prior Authorization 
One issue in determining whether knowledge regarding a lack of 
prior authorization is an essential element of the statute is determining 
whether that knowledge simply concerns authorization or if its scope 
extends to knowledge regarding the authenticity of the authorization.  In 
United States v. Gasanova,125 the Fifth Circuit considered whether a 
person charged with a violation of § 1324(a)(2) could demonstrate that 
the alien brought into the country was authorized to enter when the 
authorization was obtained fraudulently.126  The court took issue with the 
lack of clarity regarding the term “official authorization” in § 1324(a)(2), 
and questioned whether it was a violation of the statute to bring an alien 
in to the country if the defendant knows that the alien holds a valid visa 
obtained through fraud or artifice.127  It remained unclear whether an 
official-looking document, even if fraudulent, is sufficient to prove that a 
defendant was not in violation of the statute, as long as they believed that 
the alien they were bringing in to the United States did in fact have prior 
official authorization.128 
Given the dearth of guidance in congressional materials or case law 
to inform its decision, the Fifth Circuit had to look to the purpose of 
IRCA, which led to the revision of the statute, in order to try to 
understand the meaning of “official authorization.”129  The court found 
that assisting an alien with a visa that is fraudulent but in fact appears to 
be authentic goes against the very intentions of IRCA, and constitutes a 
                                                                                                                                     
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 985. 
 123 Kendrick, 682 F.3d at 985. 
 124 Id. 
 125 United States v. Gasanova, 332 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 126 Id. at 299-300. 
 127 Id. at 299. 
 128 Id. at 300. 
 129 Id. at 299. 
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violation of § 1324(a)(2); this is because the assisting person may have, 
or should have, known that the documents were fraudulent and therefore, 
the alien had no prior authorization to enter the United States.130 
The Second Circuit considered a similar question in the case of 
United States v. Calhelha.131  In Calhelha, the defendants argued that 
they did not violate U.S. immigration law because while they did bring 
an unauthorized alien into the country, the alien had a government-issued 
visa, although it was obtained through fraudulent means.132  Citing the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Gasanova, the Second Circuit found that this 
interpretation flies in the face of the “fundamental purpose” of the 
statute, and would enable violations of immigration law.133  Though the 
language of the case law does not specifically enumerate the standard 
applied, the Fifth and Second Circuit’s approach embraces the “reckless 
disregard” element of the statute, and finds culpability even where there 
may not clearly be a specific intent to violate the statute by bringing an 
alien into the country literally without any authorization.134 
g. Mens Rea is a Critical Component of Criminal Law and Should Be a 
Necessary Part of Immigration Statutes with Criminal Punishments 
Immigration violations are generally considered to be violations of 
civil law, not criminal 
law.135  However, the law provides criminal punishments for certain 
violations.136  Taking in to account that § 1324(a)(2) provides criminal 
punishment for offenses that fall within its ambit, the varying ways in 
which courts interpret and apply the mens rea requirement have created 
significant inconsistencies in the execution of immigration policy and 
criminal law. 
                                                                                                                                     
 130 Id. 
 131 456 F. Supp.2d 350 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 132 Id. at 358. 
 133 Id. 
 134 See Calhelha, 456 F. Supp.2d at 358; Gasanova, 332 F.3d at 299. 
 135 See generally Immigration Law Enforcement by State and Local Police, NATIONAL 
IMMIGRATION FORUM, http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/11652.pdf 
(last accessed May 17, 2014); Christie clarifies: ‘Illegal’ Immigrants are in civil 
violation, NEW JERSEY (Apr., 8 2008) http://nj.com/morisstown/index.ssf/morristown
/index.html; Ilona Bray, NOLO BLOG (Sept. 25, 2012) http://blog.nolo.com/immigration
/2012/09/25/should-the-media-use-the-term-illegal-alien/. 
 136 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (2012); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of 
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH & LEE 
L. REV. 469, PINCITE (2007). 
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According to the Supreme Court, when criminal statutes contain 
ambiguities, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.137  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines lenity as “[t]he quality or condition of 
being lenient; mercy or clemency.”138  Thus, ambiguities in criminal 
statutes should be resolved towards a more lenient punishment.139  The 
interpretation of a civil immigration statute with criminal penalties for 
offenses, then, becomes decidedly more complicated when trying to 
glean the applicable mens rea. 
The Supreme Court has also stated that criminal offenses 
containing no mens rea requirement are generally disfavored.140  The 
Ninth Circuit concluded in Barajas-Montiel that, because of this, 
Congress was unlikely to have dispensed with a mens rea requirement 
when it revised § 1324(a).141  Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit believes 
that the mental intent language of “knowing” and “reckless disregard” 
used in the statute actually constitutes a mens rea requirement, and found 
this to be sufficient to satisfy the mens rea presumption that is generally 
attached to statutes that provide for criminal punishment.142  Further, the 
Second Circuit has also found that in the context of immigration 
offenses, the use of “reckless disregard” as a mens rea element is 
sufficient.143 
h. The U.K. Model: A Comparison to the Use of Mens Rea In A Foreign 
Analog 
The United States has always been an attractive location for 
migration.  For decades, 
Congress and the federal government have struggled to implement 
policies that control immigration and enforce the security of U.S. 
borders.144  However, the problem of illegal immigration is hardly 
exclusive to the United States.  As other nations face similar problems of 
unauthorized entry, foreign laws have also been implemented regarding 
the control and punishment of illegal immigration.  A look at the foreign 
analogs to 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) will highlight the efficiencies and 
limitations of U.S. immigration policy. 
                                                                                                                                     
 137 Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 
81, 83 (1955). 
 138 Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), lenity. 
 139 See generally Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), rule of lenity. 
 140 Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985). 
 141 United States v. Barajas-Montiel, 185 F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 142 See generally United States v Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 143 United States v. Mussaleen, 35 F.3d 692, 698 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 144 Brianna Lee, The U.S. Immigration Debate, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
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Section 25 of the United Kingdom’s Immigration Act of 1971 
(“Section 25”), assisting unlawful immigration to member states, is the 
most comparable statute to 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(2).145  The language 
punishes an action that facilitates the breach of an immigration law by 
someone who is not a citizen of the European Union, who knows or has 
reasonable cause to know that the act would facilitate the breach, and 
knows or has reasonable cause for believing the individual is not a 
citizen.146  Subsection (1)(c) requires that the offender know or have 
reasonable cause for believing that the individual is not a citizen of the 
European Union.147  The language “know or have reasonable cause for 
believing”148 appears to be the mens rea element of Section 25, which is 
a mild contrast to the “knowing or in reckless disregard”149 language of 
§ 1324(a)(2).150  The main difference between the mens rea elements of 
the two statutes comes down to the difference between “reasonable cause 
to believe” and “reckless disregard.” As previously noted, both the Ninth 
and Eleventh Circuits have determined that the appropriate standard for 
determining knowledge or reckless disregard is one of reasonableness, as 
determined by a jury.151  This is similar to the mental intent element laid 
out by the United Kingdom.  While the United Kingdom standard of 
“reasonable cause to believe” seems to be a more lenient mental state 
standard to prove than “reckless disregard,” both statutes make room for 
looking past what actual knowledge a defendant possesses.  Both call for 
an evaluation of what would have been reasonable for the defendant to 
know or believe about the legal status of the alien involved in the 
offense. 
Another significant difference between the illegal entry policies of 
the United States and the United Kingdom is the exception made for 
                                                                                                                                     
 145 See generally Immigration Act, 1971, c.77, § 25 (UK). 
 146 § 25  Assisting unlawful immigration to member State 
(1) A person commits an offence if he— 
a. Does an act which facilitates the commission of a 
breach of immigration law by  an individual who is not a 
citizen of the European Union, 
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 149 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(2) (2012). 
 150 § 25 Immigration Act of 1971, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1971/77. 
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those with innocent and/or humanitarian intentions.  In the United 
Kingdom, the Immigration Act of 1971 includes a separate provision for 
those who assisted or facilitated entry of an alien into a member state for 
the purposes of asylum claims.152  The statute provides that only those 
who knowingly and for gain facilitate the entry of an asylum-seeker are 
punishable, excluding those who assist asylum-seekers for no gain.153  
The language of the statute specifically enumerates that organizations 
that assist asylum seekers and do not charge for their services cannot be 
penalized under Section 25A.154  This provision is in stark contrast to the 
United States illegal entry policy, which criminalizes all persons who 
facilitate the illegal entry of an alien who do not have prior official 
authorization, regardless of any subsequent official action taken.155  
Therefore, a violation of U.S. immigration law will occur even if the 
alien in question is an asylum-seeker or eligible for asylum.156 
Like § 1324, the United Kingdom’s Section 25 includes a list of 
potentially aggravating factors.157  Among these are repeat offending, 
involving strangers instead of family members, a high degree of 
sophistication, the level of involvement of the offender, the number of 
immigrants involved, etc.158  Section 1324(a)(2) provides for increased 
punishment with a minimum of one year and a maximum of fifteen years 
of imprisonment for a violation of the statute with the intent that the alien 
will violate the laws of the United states generally, a violation of the 
statute done for commercial or private gain, or a violation of the statute 
after which the alien is not brought to immigration officers immediately 
upon arrival.159  The factors listed in Section 25 seem to take into account 
                                                                                                                                     
 152 See Section 25A of Immigration Act 1971, which provides: 
(1) Helping asylum-seeker to enter United Kingdom 
a. He knowingly and for gain facilitates the arrival in the 
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the extent of the offenders’ involvement and their positive or negative 
intentions, while the factors enumerated in § 1324(a)(2) are more general 
and broad. 
III. MOVING TOWARD A SOLUTION 
a. Additional Reasons Why § 1324(a) Should be Revised 
In addition to the circuit split, which represents a lack of clarity and 
the inconsistent application of the law, there are other issues with 
§ 1324(a) that need to be addressed.  For example, in United States v. 
Assadi,160 the District Court for the District of Columbia noted that 
interpreting the ordinary meaning of § 1324 (a)(2)(B)’s language was 
problematic.161  The court found the words “bringing to” particularly 
troublesome, and questioned whether accompanying an alien to the 
American border, yet not crossing with them, constitutes “bringing to” 
and is thereby a violation of the statute.162  The court noted that Congress 
made adjustments to the statute’s language several times, highlighting 
the complex history that has followed the initial enactment.163  If the 
mens rea required by the statute is not the only aspect of the statute that 
has been unclear to reviewing courts, then it is not surprising that judicial 
application of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) has been inconsistent.  While the 
main focus of this comment is to bring much needed attention to the 
inconsistent application of the statute with regards to the mens rea 
requirement, revision of the statute would give Congress an opportunity 
to address the other areas of confusion. 
b. The Supreme Court Should Clarify the Mental Intent Requirement of 
§ 1324(a) to Allow for More Equitable and Uniform Application 
The current circuit split is problematic because it engenders the 
inconsistent application of federal law, and in effect allows potential 
smugglers to strategically plan their actions in a way that will produce a 
                                                                                                                                     
(i) [A]n offense committed with the intent or with reason to believe that the 
alien unlawfully brought into the United States will commit an offense 
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favorable outcome for them if prosecuted.164  In the Ninth Circuit, 
individuals prosecuted under § 1324(a) may be able to evade punishment 
by claiming that they did not intend to violate the provision.165  In 
Dominguez, if the alleged violation of § 1324 (a)(2) had taken place 
under the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit rather than the Eleventh, 
Dominguez’s claim that he believed the aliens he brought into the United 
States were authorized to be here because of the CAA and the Wet-
Foot/Dry-Foot policy could have been viable evidence that he did not 
intend to violate the statute.166  Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit’s stricter 
interpretation of the statute, calling for punishment even in the absence 
of willful behavior, runs the risk of punishing innocent actors.167  
Because of this disagreement among the circuits, the Supreme Court 
should address this issue in order to allow for consistent application of 
the statute among the lower courts. 
Generally, courts defer to Congress as being in control of the 
creation and meaning of statutes.168  In fact, the Supreme Court has 
consistently held that the “definition of the elements of a criminal 
offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal 
crimes, which are solely creatures of statute.”169  Accordingly, if the 
Supreme Court tries to resolve the circuit split, the Court would likely 
first consider the plain language of the statute and then the congressional 
intent in order to determine the most appropriate mens rea requirement.  
To determine Congressional intent, the court might look to legislative 
history such as House Reports, which demonstrate the concerns that 
prompted the creation of the statute, as well as discussions of the 
motivations behind it and what the goals of the statute are.  House Report 
Number 99-682 describes illegal immigration concerns, and specifically 
explains that Congress felt statutory amendments were necessary to 
control borders, prevent the unlawful employment of aliens and prevent 
public assistance abuse by aliens.170  Further, congressional records from 
                                                                                                                                     
 164 See Brett Sabbag, Case Comment, Transnational Criminal Law—Eleventh Circuit 
Does Not Require Proof of Criminal Intent for Alien Smuggling Offenses—United States 
v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051 (11th Cir. 2011), 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 493, 
502 (2012).; see also Dominguez, 661 F.3d at 1099–1101 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). 
 165 See Sabbag, supra n. 16, at 501-502; Dominguez, 661 F.3d at 1099-1101. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 See United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 149 (2000). 
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the month that § 1324 was amended contain dialogue among senators 
whose concerns regarding immigration control led to the amendment.171 
Congress revised and substantially rewrote the language of 
§ 1324(a) in order to expand the activities that are punishable under its 
scope,172 and in doing so expanded the acceptable mental intent 
necessary to satisfy the mens rea element of the offense.173  Congress did 
not mean to dispense with a mens rea element altogether, but wrote 
§ 1324(a)(2) to apply to more people than those who knew the aliens 
they were bringing in lacked prior authorization.174  The statute lays out 
the mens rea standard as “knowingly or in reckless disregard.”175  While 
there is a mens rea standard already in the language of the statute, a 
reviewing court is unlikely to try to infer and apply a different 
standard.176  If the Supreme Court decides to remedy the circuit split, it is 
likely that congressional intent along with the plain language of the 
statute will lead the court to declare that knowledge or reckless disregard 
is sufficient to establish a violation and conviction under United States 
immigration law. 
c. Statutory Revision May Provide Resolution to the Circuit Split 
If the Supreme Court does not resolve the circuit split, there are a 
few other possible 
remedies that Congress can implement.  One approach is to revise 
the language of the statute to include definitions of the different terms 
that have proven to be confusing to the different federal courts, mirroring 
the structure of the United Kingdom statutes in its Immigration Act of 
1971.  Terms included in statutes may not be intended to be interpreted 
through the word’s common usage, and such a statute might include 
definitions for the terms that have been points of confusion for courts.  
An example of this would be a clear definition of what the word “bring” 
means in the context of a § 1324(a)(2) smuggling offense. 
Another potential revision to § 1324(a)(2) would be to add a list of 
aggravating and mitigating factors in the sentencing language.  This 
would not change the meaning of the statute, but would make clear that 
the different levels of mens rea would be punished differently.  In 
amending the statute to include these additional factors, Congress should 
                                                                                                                                     
 171 See generally 132 CONG. REC. S16879-01 (Daily Ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (providing 
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 175 8 U.S.C.§1324 (a)(2) (2012). 
 176 Dominguez, 661 F.3d at 1070. 
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look to models such as the Model Penal Code for an understanding of the 
types of factors that may properly be considered aggravating or 
mitigating.177  In the case of capital punishment for murder, aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances are taken into consideration for 
sentencing.178 Aggravating circumstances include prior convictions for 
murder, committing another murder at the same time, and the murder 
having been committed for financial gain.179  Mitigating circumstances 
include having no significant criminal record, committing the murder 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, or the 
defendant being a youth at the time of the crime.180 
An approach that draws from the Model Penal Code may be 
optimal for equitable concerns.181  Further, an approach that draws from 
the Model Penal Code’s example would allow for increased judicial 
guidance, predictability, and a reduction in the “disparity in application 
and the potential abuse of discretion,”182 issues that the current statute 
and circuit split are prone to. Furthermore, adopting a more clear system 
of graded punishment based on increasing levels of mental intent is 
another nuance from the Model Penal Code183 that could be used to 
refine the current statute, providing punishment that differs not only 
based upon whether the act was done for commercial gain, but also 
whether it was done knowingly, in reckless disregard, or if the mental 
state of the actor does not rise to the level of either.  The Model Penal 
Code is structured based on principles of criminal law and punishment, 
which may cause criticism if § 1324 (a)(2) were revised to adopt a 
similar structure and principle.  While immigration law offenses are of a 
different severity and nature than capital offenses, the principle of using 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances to inform sentencing can help 
provide a punishment that takes into account all relevant circumstances 
and reflects culpability more accurately.  As previously noted, recent 
revisions of immigration law have leaned toward an increased degree of 
                                                                                                                                     
 177 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3) & (4) (1980) (providing aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances which will impact determination of culpability and sentencing). 
 178 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (2) (1980). 
 179 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (3) (1980). 
 180 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (4) (1980). 
 181 Paul H. Robinson & Markus Dirk Dubber, An Introduction to the Model Penal 
Code, https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/intromodpencode.pdf, PAGE (1999) 
(“Structurally, the Model Penal Code asks three questions: 1) is the actor’s conduct a 
crime? 2) if it is a crime, was it wrongful under these facts? 3) if it was wrongful, is the 
actor blameworthy? These questions acknowledge that a crime can be done by an actor 
who is not blameworthy.”). 
 182 Id. at 334. 
 183 Id. at 334–35. 
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criminalization,184 and a Model Penal Code-inspired approach may not 
only be informative but would be appropriate in addressing the criminal 
elements of immigration smuggling offenses. 
d. A New Approach: the Point System 
Another approach to immigration crimes and penalties that has not 
yet been commonly used in the past, if ever, is a point-system to balance 
the various factors that can inform the culpability and punishable nature 
of an immigration offense.  A point system reflects aggravating and 
mitigating factors through a point value, and the aggregate of the points 
accumulated determine the level of punishment that is applied.  A point 
system would take in to account that bringing an alien into the United 
States without authorization is against the letter of the law, but also 
reflect that in some circumstances entry is facilitated for reasons that 
may not necessarily violate the spirit of the law by assigning to each 
factor a positive or negative amount of points. 
The language of the proposed statute would be similar to that of 
§ 1324 (a)(2). The point-based statute would provide that: 
“A person is guilty of assisting illegal entry into the United States 
if they bring a person who has not had prior authorization into the 
country to any place within the United States.” 
A. Point Values185 
—(0) points assigned for actually committing the act; 
—(1) point for committing the act in reckless 
disregard186 of the fact that      the alien did not have 
prior authorization to enter the United States; 
—(2) points for committing the act knowing187 that 
the alien did not have prior authorization to enter the 
United States; 
                                                                                                                                     
 184 Legomsky, supra note 136, at 471–72. 
 185 The proposed use of a point system, in the context of immigration policy and 
enforcement, is an original idea, guided by the relevant immigration case law and policy 
concerns.  Point systems have been used in other contexts, for example, in Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines. 
 186 See United States v Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 781 (11th Cir. 2006).  The point system is 
implemented using the same interpretation of “reckless disregard” as courts have 
previously used regarding § 1324 (a)(2). 
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—(2) points if the act was done for commercial 
gain188; 
—(2) points if the act was done with the intention to 
pursue commercial +gain once entry was achieved189; 
—up to (3) points if violence190 was involved in the 
commission of the act; 
—(2) points if illegal substances were involved; 
—and an additional (1) point is assigned if this is in 
furtherance of a larger or more substantial operation; 
—(-.50) points if the person is a child191; 
—(-.50) points if the person qualifies for asylum 
status or intends to apply; 
—(-.25) points if the person is presented to 
immigration officials directly; 
—(-.25) points assigned if the person is a family 
member. 
B. Based on the points accrued: the penalties can be a fine and/or 
probation  (up to (1) point),  a fine and/or 6 months imprisonment 
                                                                                                                                     
 187 See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998).  The point system is 
implemented using the same interpretation of “knowing/knowingly” that the Supreme 
Court has previously defined. 
 188 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (including an increased punishment for a 
violation perpetrated for commercial advantage or private financial gain). 
 189 Id. 
 190 This was selected as an aggravating factor because there are numerous cases in 
which bringing aliens into the country illegally results in violence and even death.  See 
generally Jacqueline Armendariz, Agencies tell of immigrant deaths, rescues, VALLEY 
MORNING STAR (December 25, 2012, 6:30 PM), 
http://www.valleymorningstar.com/news/article_27f7991c-4ef3-11e2-9e7a-
0019bb30f31a.html; see also John MacCormack, Immigrant deaths soar in South Texas, 
MY SAN ANTIONIO (December 30, 2012). http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_new
s/article/Border-woes-no-longer-just-on-the-border-4155003.php. 
 191 These factors were developed based on general principles of immigration law. See 
generally the INA, which includes provisions for asylum and refugee seekers, those who 
enter the country illegally but present themselves to officials immediately, and policies 
such as withholding of removal which reflect the consideration of children and the family 
unit. 
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(1-1.5 points), and prison sentences increase as the points 
increase with a maximum of 10 years imprisonment. 
In its application, a statute applied through a point system can 
increase the efficiency of courts in making decisions, and also narrow the 
scope of potential factors to look at during an appeal.  A point system, 
however, might seem arbitrary, as the value of certain factors, such as 
whether the alien was a family member, can play a larger role in different 
circumstances.  For example, if that family member was a person’s 
young daughter and was subject to female genital mutilation in her native 
country,192 some might question whether the points allotted to the family 
member should be the same as the point value for a person who 
smuggles a distant cousin into the United States as a part of a drug 
operation.  However, the point value assigned to all of the other factors 
considered will reflect the wide range of persons and motives.  While it 
may seem inequitable that both of these offenders receive the same 
amount of points for such divergent family connections, each offender 
would also receive positive or negative points for other factors—such as 
if they performed the act in connection with another crime or for 
financial gain—and as such concerns of equity are minimalized. 
An increase in prosecutorial discretion, particularly in cases that 
involve children, family members, and asylum-seekers, among others, 
can help to remedy the potential damage that the arbitrary enforcement 
of immigration laws can have on aliens and families.193  In immigration 
cases that involve the illegal entry of children, some courts have allowed 
the best interests of the child to inform their decisions, particularly in the 
case of asylum-seekers.194  But increased prosecutorial discretion can 
lead to abuses of this discretion in cases that are particularly sympathetic 
or relatable.  Using a point system helps to standardize the process but 
take into consideration the family and children involved. 
A variety of individuals commit immigration offenses for a wide 
range of reasons.  In a large, complicated system, concerns of efficiency 
are at the forefront of factors that must inform the decision to implement 
a law or system to control immigration.  Even the combination of 
                                                                                                                                     
 192 See generally Meredith Aherne, Olowo v. Ashcroft: Granting Parental Asylum 
Based on a Child’s Refugee Status, 18 PACE INT’L L. REV. 317 (2006) (discussing female 
genital mutilation (“FGM”), and the need for a more workable immigration policy, 
specifically asylum law, that promotes family unity and recognizes FGM as a worldwide 
problem). 
 193 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration 
Law, 9 CONN.PUB. INT. L. J. 243, 245–46 (2010). 
 194 Mary-Hunter Morris, Babies and Bathwater: Seeking an Appropriate Standard of 
Review for the Asylum Applications of Former Child Soldiers, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 
281, 296 (2008). 
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consideration of the totality of circumstances, prosecutorial discretion, 
and individual consideration on a case-by-basis will not guarantee a 
balanced outcome in every case.  But by implementing a point-system, 
there is room for both subjective and objective analysis, and an 
opportunity for the justice system to provide each person with both 
efficiency and fairness in the consideration of their offenses. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A significant problem with the current state of § 1324 (a)(2) is the 
fact that the federal circuit courts are split on the mental intent necessary 
to violate the statute.  This disagreement means that two persons 
committing identical offenses would be subject to entirely different 
outcomes under the same federal law simply based on what part of the 
United States they assisted an illegal entry into.195  In the Eleventh 
Circuit, this means that two people who helped an unauthorized alien 
enter the country are subject to criminal penalties regardless of the 
reasons behind their actions. 
The criminalization of immigration offenses has become an 
emerging trend in the United States.196  Within the last twenty years, 
there has been a growing anti-immigrant197 and anti-immigration 
sentiment emerging in American society, which has in turn informed the 
development of immigration laws and policies.198  Although stricter 
immigration policies may be necessary to manage the logistics of 
increasing immigration into the United States, it is important that 
Congress and the courts implement and foster policies that punish only 
those who are culpable, and not those who innocently or unknowingly 
violate the law.  Furthermore, it is significant that there is a degree of 
predictability to immigration laws so that individuals are put on notice of 
the law and whether actions they may engage in could result in 
compromising their freedom through criminal punishment. 
Consider again the case of Eduin Rordriguez.  Abandoned by his 
parents at a young age, Eduin traveled through several countries in 
                                                                                                                                     
 195 Sabbag, supra note 16, at 501–02. 
 196 Legomsky, supra note 136, at 475. 
 197 See generally Roque Planas, Jose Antonio Vargas Restarts ‘Illegal’ v. 
‘Undocumented” Debates, Highlighting Role of Latino Media, HUFFINGTON POST , Sept.  
27, 2012, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/27/jose-antonio-vargas-ill
egal-undocumented_n_1918631.html; see also Ilona Bray, supra note 115 (speaking to 
the general anti-immigrant sentiment that has been clearly expressed in the media). 
 198 Dawn Marie Johnson, Treating Misdemeanors as Felonies for Immigration 
Purposes, 27 J. LEGIS. 477, 479–80 (2001). 
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dangerous conditions to arrive in the United States.199  Presumably, a 
child such as Eduin must have received help from well-meaning people 
along the way.  Under the language of § 1324(a)(2), the people who 
helped Eduin travel safely and cross the border would be subjecting 
themselves to criminal punishment under § 1324(a)(2) in the Eleventh 
Circuit by doing so.  Eduin is not the first innocent person in need of help 
to reach safety in the United States, and he will not be the last.  Allowing 
for some flexibility and predictability in the enforcement of §1342(a)(2) 
is one way to be sure that those who helped Eduin find his way out of 
danger are not punished unreasonably, and those who encounter 
vulnerable, hurt people in need of assistance in the future do not feel as 
though they have no choice but to turn a blind eye. 
The current circuit split regarding § 1324(a)(2) presents both 
Congress and the Supreme Court with a unique opportunity to remedy an 
issue regarding a very specific subsection of a large body of law, and at 
the same time speak to the larger issue of immigration control and reform 
in the United States.  Addressing this circuit split is an opportunity for 
the government to remedy some of the existing tension and confusion 
regarding immigration law, preventing the unnecessary and unwarranted 
encroachment on the liberty of those individuals who may commit 
immigration violations innocently and perhaps even accidentally.  By 
clarifying this one aspect of immigration law and policy, we have an 
opportunity to help control future unauthorized entry, encourage 
immigration through the proper channels, acknowledge that immigration 
and the concerns surrounding it are both complex and constantly 




 199 Julia Preston, Young and Alone, Facing Court and Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, 
August 25, 2012, available at www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/us/more-young-illegal-
immigrants-face-deportation.hmtl?pagewanted. 
